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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is seeing 
increased application in planning and design of NASA’s 
missions. This suggests the question: what will be the 
corresponding practice of Model Based Mission Assurance
(MBMA)?
Contemporaneously, NASA’s Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance (OSMA) is evaluating a new objectives-
based approach to standards to ensure that the Safety and 
Mission Assurance disciplines and programs are addressing 
the challenges of NASA’s changing missions, acquisition and 
engineering practices, and technology. MBSE is a prominent 
example of a changing engineering practice.
We use NASA’s objectives-based strategy for Reliability 
and Maintainability as a means to examine how MBSE will 
affect assurance. We surveyed MBSE literature to look 
specifically for these affects, and find a variety of them 
discussed (some are anticipated, some are reported from 
applications to date). Predominantly these apply to the early 
stages of design, although there are also extrapolations of how 
MBSE practices will have benefits for testing phases.
As the effort to develop MBMA continues, it will need to 
clearly and unambiguously establish the roles of uncertainty 
and risk in the system model.  This will enable a variety of
uncertainty-based analyses to be performed much more 
rapidly than ever before and has the promise to increase the 
integration of CRM (Continuous Risk Management) and PRA 
(Probabilistic Risk Analyses) even more fully into the project 
development life cycle.  
Various views and viewpoints will be required for 
assurance disciplines, and an over-arching viewpoint will then 
be able to more completely characterize the state of the 
project/program as well as (possibly) enabling the safety case 
approach for overall risk awareness and communication.
1 INTRODUCTION
Model Based System Engineering (MBSE) – for a survey, 
see [1] – is beginning to see substantial use within NASA for 
the planning and design of space missions. The promise of 
MBSE includes a single authoritative source of truth, correct 
by construction models, scalability, discipline-specific 
viewpoints, customizable interface, and fully integrated design 
environments. For these reasons and more, it is anticipated 
MBSE will enable more capable missions without sacrificing 
cost-effectiveness despite increase in complexity. Because of 
its growing adoption in the aerospace industry and because it 
is imperative that there is not a sacrifice of safety and mission 
success, NASA’s OSMA has initiated a planning effort to 
pave the way for full integration of mission assurance into this 
model-based world – “Model Based Mission Assurance.”
Contemporaneously, NASA has begun to develop 
Objective Structure Hierarchies [2]. As stated therein,
“Creating a hierarchy as a basis for assurance 
implementation is a proven approach that has emerged from 
the safety case ideals. This approach holds the opportunity to 
enable new directions in an evolving design framework, in 
which models will govern optimization to achieve the best 
designs and prescribed documents will take a back seat.” 
NASA’s hierarchies consist of strategies and objectives that 
build upon each other to support their top objective. For 
example, the Reliability and Maintainability hierarchy has as 
its top objective “System performs as required over the 
lifecycle to satisfy mission objectives.” This subdivides into:
1. System conforms to design intent and performs as planned. 
2. System remains functional for intended lifetime, 
environment, operating conditions and usage.
3. System is tolerant to faults, failures and other anomalous 
internal and external events.
4. System has an acceptable level of maintainability and 
operational availability.
To date, the Reliability and Maintainability, Software 
Assurance, ELV Payload and Range Safety hierarchies have 
been developed, and Quality Assurance and EEE Parts
hierarchies’ development is underway. As reflected in Figure 
1, they are to serve as the starting points from which to
develop system-specific safety or assurance cases, central to 
the direction in which system safety and reliability is evolving 
within NASA [3],[4]. This will occur in an environment where 
the assurance of the system is shared within the modeling 
frame work.
We have surveyed MBSE literature to find how MBSE 
capabilities have the potential to support assurance. In section 
2 we compare those capabilities to the strategies and 
objectives of the Reliability and Maintainability hierarchy to 
estimate how and where they will contribute to assurance.
From this perspective we see that sub-objectives 1, 2 & 3 
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(from the list above) are well covered by MBSE literature 
through the stages of system concept, requirements and
design, including validation and verification during those 
stages. For the subsequent stages: development (build, 
integrate, test), operation, and maintenance, there is some 
discussion of MBSE’s support for testing, and some mention 
of (software) code generation from models, but overall 
relatively little is said about these later lifecycle stages.   
However, given the evolving practice of MBSE, this lack of 
application in later project phases is expected since notions 
familiar to OSMA have yet to be fully integrated into MBSE.  
Thus, the time is right for inclusion into MBSE.
2 MBSE’S SUPPORT FOR ASSURANCE OBJECTIVES
Figure 1 - Assurance Framework in Model Based 
Environment
We surveyed relevant MBSE literature to find how MBSE 
approaches are being applied to support assurance needs. This 
section presents s summary, organized into seven areas. We 
indicate each area’s relevance to NASA’s R&M Objectives 
Hierarchy [5]. More details of each area are given in the 
following section.
1. Representation and management of systems 
engineering information to ensure consistency and (some 
aspects of) completeness. Rigorous model-based
representation (i.e., with a semantic underpinning that ensures 
a shared, unambiguous understanding) of systems engineering 
information is the hallmark of MBSE. This has relevance and 
benefit to the entire R&M Objectives Hierarchy to the extent 
that MBSE is carried through the mission lifecycle. May 
provide specific benefit in 1.B.1.A (Test, inspect, and 
demonstrate to an acceptable level to ensure that issues are 
found) through heading off subtle and hard to detect problems 
that stem from misinterpretations prevalent when less rigorous 
documentation is the norm.
2. Support of the contractual interface between acquirer 
and potential suppliers. One purpose of using NASA’s 
Objectives Hierarchies is for it to be the means for a developer 
or service provider to communicate assurance information to 
NASA.
3. Generation of review documentation from the shared 
MBSE system model. Preliminary results from ongoing NASA 
applications show evidence of benefits to R&M Hierarchy
1.A.1.A (Demonstrate to an acceptable level that the 
functionality of the system meets the design intent). E.g., for 
generation of review material at key decision points.
4. Automated assistance for generating reliability 
artifacts (FMECAs, Fault Trees, etc.). Relevant to the sub-
objective 2 (System remains functional for intended lifetime, 
environment, operating conditions and usage) and 3 (System is 
tolerant to faults, failures and other anomalous internal and 
external events). However, results to date have not extended 
into later phases of development, most especially operations.
5. Representation of and reasoning about off-nominal 
states and behaviors. A fundamental capability supporting the 
previous area (reliability artifacts), therefore likewise relevant 
to sub-objectives 2 and 3.
6. Support for activities post-design. While most of the 
MBSE literature focuses on the design stage, some address 
later activities, notably testing. Planning for and managing the 
testing activities could potentially benefit from the same 
MBSE principles of capturing the pertinent information in a 
formal representation, relevant to: 1.B.1.A, 2.A.1.D (Perform 
qualification testing and life demonstration to verify design for 
intended use), 2.B.1.D (Plan and perform life testing), 4.A.1.G 
(Provide demonstration testing to verify ‘detect, diagnose, 
isolate’ capability of systems and confirm corrective and 
preventive maintenance task actions and analysis) and 1.C.1.D 
(Screening, proof testing and acceptance testing). In the 
software arena there are instances of software being
automatically generated from models, thus contributing to 1.C 
(Achieve high level of process reliability), and of software 
being extensively tested against computer simulations of the 
system and its operating conditions.
7. Correctness of the MBSE models themselves. Since the 
system design information is captured in models, it is crucial 
that they be correct, with obvious relevance to the R&M 
Objectives Hierarchy. This is an area where assurance 
practices can contribute to the MBSE methodology.
3 DETAILED LITERATURE SURVEY
3.1 Representation  and Management of systems engineering 
information
In general, many papers and presentations argue for the 
benefit of model-centric rather than document-centric design; 
the following examples report application to space systems.
Integration of flight software developed for the James 
Webb Space Telescope’s Integrated Science Instrument 
Module is briefly reported in [6]. The C&DH Core Flight 
Software (FSW) development was done at GSFC and the 
Science Instrument FSW applications were developed by 
different teams at several disparate locations. A Rational Rose 
Structure Diagram was used to unambiguously indicate the 
core system’s communication ports to other subsystem 
components and to its own internal “capsules”. 
Use of MBSE to manage development of the ground 
system for control of the OSIRIS-Rex spacecraft during its 
encounter with asteroid Bennu is described in [7]. Three areas 
are listed as benefiting from MBSE: representation and flow
down of the requirements on the ground system, 
representation of its architecture (leading to development of 
the formal documentation of that architecture in the form of 
Interface Control Documents and Operational Interface 
Agreements), and capture of testing and V&V plans. In 
addition to diagramming static views of the architecture, 
FFBDs (Functional Flow Block Diagrams) are used to support 
discrete-event simulation of system behaviors to validate the 
system’s run-time behavior.
Similar benefits are reported in [8] in the related area of 
systems engineering of astronomical telescopes.
3.2 Support of the contractual interface
A report on “research practices pertaining to methods, 
tools, and techniques proposed to facilitate the use of MBSE 
across the contractual interface in a competitive tender 
environment” is given in [9]. The authors assert that MBSE 
has long been successfully applied across contractual 
boundaries in settings where “mutual trust is well developed 
and mutual goals are well understood.” Their paper addresses 
the situation of a competitive environment, where a supplier 
would wish to excise proprietary information from the model 
they submit as part of the bid, and the acquirer would wish to 
excise certain sensitive information (e.g., costing, 
management) from the model they put forth to elicit bids. The 
paper lists details on these topics resulting from “workshops 
with key stakeholders.” They go on to mention that the 
acquirer’s model served as a good starting point for the 
supplier to elaborate further into a more detailed model.
3.3 Generation of review documentation 
“Document/Expert – Centric Acquisition” is contrasted 
with “Data-Driven/MBSE Acquisition” in [10], which
suggests many of the analysis results needed for acquisition 
decisions can be machine-generated from models, replacing 
labor intensive human assessments by teams of experts. 
Textual forms of the acquirer’s Operational Concept 
Document, Function and Performance Specification and Test 
Concept Document as described as being generated from a
reference model in [9]. It also goes on to say that some 
members of the supplier team worked directly from the model, 
and those that initially preferred to work from the generated 
textual forms increasingly switched to the model.
A pilot study on a “moderate size flight project” –
MISSE-X, a payload for hosting experiments, to be installed 
on the exterior of the ISS is reported in [11]. The report 
discussed the pros and cons of MBSE in preparation for the 
project’s System Requirements Review. They used:
? SysML to “document the system concept of operations as 
well as some assembly, integration and test activities” 
(use-case diagrams for stakeholder interactions, activity 
diagrams to document system functions, activity 
diagrams, state-machine diagrams and sequence diagrams 
to document intended behavior, package diagram of 
system architecture and external boundaries, IBD for 
flows and interfaces between systems) and 
? Vitech’s CORE™ to manage the requirements 
(traceability through levels of requirements, allocations, 
owners and verification methods). 
They report benefits of consistency, ease of access to 
complete, current information, and clarity across the team. The 
review need was to demonstrate existence of a feasible and 
satisfactory system design (feasible = could be implemented 
consistent with cost, schedule & risk; satisfactory = design 
meets project goals).
Exports from CORE used to provide information to team 
members without requiring them to be CORE users, and to 
generate complete documents directly from CORE. Review
materials were developed from the SysML and CORE models.
However, their paper identifies several challenges:
? “no guarantee that the model is correct” – note that they 
did not pursue extensively execution of models, stating 
“developing executable models within the model itself 
was found to be challenging”
? Restarts in creating the meta-model (ontology)
? Default presentation options from SysML tool often 
needed extensive re-working.
3.4 Generation of reliability artifacts 
There are numerous examples of MBSE being used to 
provide automated assistance to generate reliability artifacts 
(FMECAs, Fault Trees, etc.). 
Generation of FMEAs from SysML information, 
specifically from Sequence Diagrams (SDs) and Internal 
Block Diagrams (IBDs), is described in [12] & [13] (see also 
the next section for further papers by the same set of authors). 
They assume a database (referred to in the paper as a 
“Dysfunctional Behavior Database”) of components and their 
failure properties – their failure modes, and (optionally) 
additional information such as failure rate. They further allow 
for the following:
? A Parametric Diagram (PD) expressing the computation 
of functional attributes degradation during the failure 
mode occurrence. 
? A PD indicating the computation of the failure rate of 
each failure mode. (This constraint depends on the 
environmental and structural parameters)
? A Statechart Diagram describing the dynamic behavior of 
the component in the failure mode state.
They stress that in IBDs they utilize two kinds of ports –
standard ports and flow ports. The former are suited for 
representing control and command requests (including 
exchange of information); the latter are suited to 
representation of data, material or energy flowing through the 
connectors to/from such ports.
Scalable, automated generation of a FMEA, illustrated on 
a model of a satellite, its ground control system, and ground 
users is concisely reported in [14]. They assume a SysML 
model with BDDs, IBDs (in which failure propagation paths 
are represented), state transition machines (including both 
normal and failed states) and activity diagrams (that generate 
the triggers driving state transitions). From these they also 
automatically generate a model to input into AltaRica (“a tool 
and language implementing mode automata”) to model fault 
propagation.
Collaborations between Johnson Space Center and 
Tietronix Software Inc. are reported in [15] & [16].
Generation of a FMECA and a Fault Tree from a SysML 
model is illustrated in [15]. They too assume that SysML IBD 
has the details of the system architecture and that the state 
transition diagrams include nominal and off-nominal (failed) 
states, using state machine events and guards to encode 
propagation of failure effects from one component to another. 
The example they use as illustration is a “Common Cabin Air 
Assembly” to provide life-critical air circulation in the ISS, 
and they show how the generated FMECA takes into account 
the fault-tolerance provided by redundancy in the modeled 
system. It does not appear that they deal with continuous 
physical flows in the same manner [12]. Application to design 
of a water recycling system (the “Cascade Distillation 
System”) intended for use in the context of a human mission 
to Mars (for which high reliability and low mass are both 
driving concerns that make the design a challenge) is reported 
in [16]. The paper shows the results of their tooling to (a) 
“extract the FMECA from the … FSMs [Finite State 
Machines] defining the possible failed states” and (b) 
“traverse behavior diagrams to extract the fault event paths for 
analysis”, combining these into a fault tree.
An approach to automatic generation of FMEA and Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) artifacts from system models is outlined 
in [17] & [18]. Their FMEA generation process starts from a 
top-level functional breakdown for the system, and yields a 
list of generic failure modes for those functions and potential 
causes and effects. At this stage additional failure modes can 
be added manually. Having allocated components to functions, 
the generation of a component FMEA proceeds in a similar 
manner. Their Fault Tree generation process utilizes the 
FMEAs, and hinges on graph-traversals of SysML Internal 
Block Diagrams (IBDs) that express component interactions 
and the internal structure (connectivity) of the system. They 
show how they convert patterns inside an IBD representing 
redundancy or feedback loops into the corresponding fault tree 
structures using AND and OR gates as appropriate. They use 
as illustration an electromechanical actuator used to actuate 
ailerons – this is described as a case study, but not an actual 
industrial application.
3.5 Off-nominal states and behaviors 
Off-nominal behavior, of particular interest to the OSMA 
practitioners, has begun to be explored in the context of 
MBSE.  Open questions remain regarding the integration of 
risk into the models and a methodology for 
managing/reducing these risks.
Verification of fault management behavior by execution 
of a stateflow model of NASA’s Ares & Orion communication 
during abort is briefly reported in [6]. Provides an illustration 
of a missing transition guard, presumably discovered in a 
simulation that exhibited an unwanted launch delay. Other 
examples of errors “found through modeling” are also listed.
A small manually conducted feasibility study, of 
representing failures so as to check for safety and security 
properties such as “robust to any single failure”, “robust to 
erroneous data”, “resilient to fake GPS signal” is reported in 
[19]. They indicate the potential for translation into Alloy, a 
language and toolset for formal analysis of consistency.
The need to integrate the representation of, and reasoning 
about, off-nominal behavior with the standard system 
engineering process is addressed in [20]. They describe typical 
reliability activities (e.g., FMEA) and their data sources & 
sinks. They stress the need to model the dynamics of off-
nominal behaviors, presenting a meta-model (ontology 
extensions) appropriate to this, including treatment of off-
nominal behaviors at multiple levels of abstraction (boolean to 
represent working or not; qualitative to include representation 
of “degraded” conditions; formulae for quantitative 
calculations e.g., using failure rate values). Semi-automated 
mapping from SysML into AADL for purposes of analyzing 
real-time aspects of the computational aspects of the system is 
detailed in [21] (the AADL language and associated tools 
provide another model-based approach to representation and 
reasoning for real-time software systems development; see 
also [22] for AADL and MBSE). 
A “safety profile” – stereotypes to extend SysML in order 
to represent information relevant to failures etc. (“safety 
profile” could equivalently be called meta-model or ontology)
is presented in [17]. They offer a case study using it to 
represent failure information for an electromechanical actuator 
– specifically, an actuator of the ailerons in an aircraft. They 
also describe semi-automatic generation of FMEAs from this 
information – see the “Automated assistance for generating 
reliability artifacts” subsection for further discussion of this.
3.6 Support for activities post-design
Relatively few instances of the MBSE literature report on 
post-design application of MBSE. This may be because MBSE 
cannot readily be adopted midway through a system’s 
lifecycle, so the majority of the applications (and hence the 
majority of the attention) has so far been focused on systems 
in their early phases. Nevertheless, a few papers take the 
approach of looking ahead to how MBSE might assist those 
later lifecycle phases.
Two of us argue for a model of system information that 
spans the entire lifecycle, all the way from design choices, 
through development and V&V, to operation, in [23]. The 
main elements of this model are requirements, functions, 
components, risks, work breakdown structure, and 
implementation – that last encompassing operational scenarios 
in which the modeled system is analyzed for its operational 
performance. This end-to-end model allows study of the cost
and schedule implications of alternative designs and 
alternative approaches to their V&V, and the resulting 
likelihoods of mission success measured in terms of 
probabilistic attainments of mission objectives. The key 
addition this paper offered to model based engineering 
frameworks was its representation of risk (through inclusion 
of off-nominal behaviors of the system’s components). 
The topic of “Managing the development of system 
testing using the principles of Model Based System 
Engineering” is addressed in [24]. It makes the observation 
that requirements, functions and components (which we see 
repeated as the core concepts of many of the systems 
engineering ontologies) all factor into system testing.
The question “could system integration and verification 
planning benefit from the capabilities of MBSE?” is addressed 
in [25], which also “proposes an information model to use 
model-based systems engineering to actually plan integration 
and test activities of a system.” The usual benefits attributed to 
model-centric representations of design information (single 
source of information, model-based rather than document 
based, representation of relationships between artifacts) are 
described as applicable to systems integration and verification. 
The paper reports having developed an information model 
with which to represent integration and test artifacts and 
activities.
“V&V may be the biggest benefactor from the MBSE 
approach” is asserted in [7], which goes on to say “… by 
mapping requirements to architecture and defining operational 
scenarios as they are being developed, …, the basis for 
defining detailed verification descriptions, success criteria, 
and other verification artifacts are distributed throughout the 
lifecycle.”
Verification of safety requirements in software-intensive 
systems is considered in [26]. They point out that formal 
(mathematical) methods are required to rigorously prove 
safety properties, and discuss translation from typical SysML 
representations to the models and properties needed by the 
formal methods, for example the model checker UPPAAL 
(from www.uppaal.org “UPPAAL is an integrated tool 
environment for modeling, validation and verification of real-
time systems modeled as networks of timed automata, 
extended with data types (bounded integers, arrays, etc.”). 
They present an example of a mechanical press controlled by 
software in a programmable logic controller, considering the 
verification of requirements allocations from system to its 
components, a mix of software, mechanical and electro-
mechanical. 
In the software arena, the James Webb Space Telescope’s 
use of automated code generation of “Task distribution” and 
“Message distribution” code is reported in [6]. The use of 
Model Based Software development to develop much of the 
on-board software of the LADEE spacecraft, and also to 
develop ground code to simulate the spacecraft, is reported in 
[27] & [28]. The latter was used in extensive testing of the on-
board software, in operator training during mission
simulations and readiness testing, and for verification of 
command sequences prior to their uploading to the spacecraft 
during the operational portion of the mission.
3.7 Correctness of the MBSE models themselves
Ways to address the question of correctness of MBSE 
models are advocated in [10]. It describes inspections of
several of the kinds of models found in typical MBSE 
developments, using as illustration reference systems from 
grad school projects (in the naval domain). The inspections 
listed cover: requirements; mission and operations and 
interoperability; functionality, interfaces and continuity;
system content flow; system behavior; system realization;
allocation, and integrity; integrate-ability; qualify-ability.
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